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STATUTES: 
U.C.A. §34A-2-105(l)(2001) 3, 6 
U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)0')(2001) 3 
RULES: 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 3-6 
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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-
3(2)(j)(2001)(pour-over civil jurisdiction). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The following issue is presented on appeal: 
Was Mojica within the course of his employment when he burned himself with a product at home? 
A trial court's grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is reviewed de novo. Mounteer v. Utah Power & 
Light, 173 P.2d 405, 406 (Utah App. 1989), reversed on other grounds, 823 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1991) 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
2003 UT 4; 2003 Utah LEXIS 11. Either way, review is de novo. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The determinative statute is as follows: 
U.C.A. §34A-2-105(l)(2001): 
Exclusive remedy against employer, and officer, agent, or employee of employer - Employee leasing 
arrangements. 
(1) The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries sustained by an employee, 
whether resulting in death or not, shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be 
the exclusive remedy against any officer, agent, or employee of the employer and the liabilities of 
the employer imposed by this chapter shall be in place of any and all other civil liability whatsoever, 
at common law or otherwise, to the employee or to the employee's spouse, widow, children, parents, 
dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, 
on account of any accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated, or 
incurred by the employee in the course of or because of or arising out of the employee's 
employment, and no action at law may be maintained against an employer or against any officer, 
agent, or employee of the employer based upon any accident, injury, or death of an employee. 
Nothing in this section, however, shall prevent an employee, or the employee's dependents, from 
filing a claim for compensation in those cases in accordance with Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act. 
(Emphasis added). 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from summary judgment in favor of Mojica's immediate employer, 
O'Currance, a telemarketing company. 
2. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below 
Mojica sued his employer, O'Currance, for injuries he received while attempting to use a 
medical device which was given to him by O'Currance. O'Cunance filed a motion to dismiss under 
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief might be granted. The motion 
was granted, and this appeal followed. 
3. Statement of Relevant Facts on Appeal 
Mojica was an employee of O'Currance a telemarketing company. (R. 3). His job was to sell 
products on the telephone at his employer's premises. (Id.). O'Currance was contracted to sell a 
medical heating lamp. (Id., 1-3). The purpose of this heating lamp was to heal the body in some 
fashion. (Id.). There is no evidence, however, that the medical device was ever submitted to or 
approved by the Food and Drug Administration. 
Defendant NWN, a seller and distributor of the heat lamp, as part of its transaction with 
O'Currance, sent O'Currance a sample heat lamp for O'Currance and its employees to use. (Id.). On 
November 11, 2002, O'Currance gave the heat lamp to Mojica. (Id.). Mojica took the heat lamp 
home, read the instructions, and, following the product's claims and instructions, used the lamp to 
heat his shins and left hand, to treat pain in them. (Id.). Mojica placed the lamp at the specified 
distance from his shins and left hand, and warmed them for the specified time. (Id.). Unfortunately, 
the heat lamp severely burned him, causing him medical expenses, emotional anguish, pain, 
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suffering, permanent scarring, and wage loss. (Id.). 
Mojica was not working at the time of he used the lamp. (R. 38). He was at home, off the 
clock. (Id.). There were no customers present when he used the heat lamp. (Id.). Mojica did no work 
from home; all calls for O'Currance were made from their corporate offices. (Id.). 
O'Currance made a motion to dismiss pursuant to Utah Rule Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), on 
the basis that Mojica's exclusive remedy was to seek worker's compensation benefits. (R. 15-22). 
No supporting documents were filed; Mojica filed a short affidavit in opposition to the motion. (R. 
37-39). No answer has been filed; no discovery has been done. The trial court concluded as a matter 
of law from the complaint and Mojica's affidavit that Mojica was in the course of his employment 
when he was injured. (R. 67). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah has adopted the "premises" rule in determining whether an employee is on-the-job for 
workers compensation purposes. While there are limited exceptions to that rule, none of them apply 
here. Mojica did not have a home office. He did no work at home. He was subject to fixed times of 
employment. He was not traveling, and his employment had a fixed location. To find that Mojica 
was acting in the course of his employment while using a product at home to treat himself would 
expand workers compensation coverage beyond any principled limits. 
ARGUMENT 
A. 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD AN INADEQUATE RECORD TO DECIDE THE CASE 
In order for the exclusive remedy provision to apply, Mojica must have been "in the course 
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of [his] employment". U.C.A. §34A-2-105(l)(2001). "Scope-of-employment issues are in general 
highly fact dependent."Drake v. Industrial Comm% 939 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1997). 
In reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim, this court must construe the 
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all reasonable 
inferences in plaintiffs favor. Arrow Indus, v. Zions First Nafl Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 
936 (Utah 1988). Such a dismissal is appropriate only where it appears to a certainty 
that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts which could 
be proved in support of the claims asserted. Freegard v. First W. Nat'l Bank, 73 8 P.2d 
614, 616 (Utah 1987). 
Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light, 113 P.2d 405,406 (Utah App. 1989), reversed on other grounds, 
823 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1991). 
No fact-finding occurred at the trial court level, as the case was decided under Rule 12(b)(6). 
Mojica was reluctant to flesh out the record for the benefit of the moving party, O'Currance, which 
bore the burden of pursuasion. What there was in the record was insufficient to state that Mojica 
"would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved". There was no 
evidence from the employer as to the circumstances surrounding Mojica's possession of the medical 
heating lamp. The employer never filed an answer, nor committed itself to paying worker's 
compensation benefits. Mojica never was deposed to fill in the factual gaps in the story. Basically, 
the trial court concluded that the exclusive remedy was worker's compensation solely on the basis 
that Mojica got the medical heat lamp from his work. That was an insufficient basis to turn Mojica 
out of court. 
B. 
MOJICA WAS NOT IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT 
If the record was adequate to decide as if by summary judgment, the evidence clearly showed 
that Mojica was not in the course of his employment. Utah generally follows the ''premises rule", 
6 
which adopts the bright-line test of the edge of the employer's premises; if the employee crosses the 
property line onto the employer's premises, he is in the course of employment, but before that 
moment, he is not in the course of his employment. The Utah Supreme Court has refused to extend 
this rule except in certain clearly defined situations. Soldier Creek Coal Co. v. Bailey, 709 P.2d 1165 
(Utah 1985). 
L "Special Hazards" 
The employee may be covered by worker's compensation if there are special hazards on the 
road or path to the job site. Park Utah Consolidated Mines Co. v. Industrial Comm 'n, 103 Utah 64, 
133 P.2d 314 (1943). Mojica was sitting at home when he burned himself, so that exception is 
clearly inapplicable. Mojica's home was no "special hazard". 
2. "Traveling Employee" 
The employee may also be covered if he is traveling for the employer's benefit. Comm. 
Carriers v. Industrial Comm'n, 888 P.2d 707 (Utah App. 1994)(trucker on long haul engaged in 
fight to protect load, while resting for the night at truck stop); Buczynski v. Industrial Comm fn, 934 
P.2d 1169 (Utah App. 1997)(college professor on trip to seminar; compensation denied when injured 
on "personal lark"); State Tax Comm 'n v. Industrial Comm 'n, 685 P.2d 1051 (Utah 1984)(employee 
commuting from Brigham City to Salt Lake City for two month work training seminar was in course 
of employment when injured in auto accident). But Mojica had merely gone home after work, and 
was no "traveling employee". 
1 "Home Office" 
The employer's premises may be the employee's home, which provides the rationale for the 
"home office" rule. Essentially, the home office becomes the workplace, and so becomes the 
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premises for purposes of worker's compensation. Ae Clevite, Inc. v. Labor Comm 'n9 996 P.2d 1072; 
2000 UT App 35 (salesman worked out of his home for employer with no offices in Utah; 
compensation awarded for fall on icy driveway). 
The trial court placed reliance upon the Ae Clevite case to justify dismissal. In doing so, it 
overlooked critical factual distinctions. Mojica was not working at home. He made no sales calls at 
home; he was paid hourly for the time he was at O'Currance, but not when he was at home. Unlike 
Ae Clevite, his employer, O'Currance, has a Utah work site, in fact, a very large one. The "home 
office" rule does not apply to Mojica either. 
4. "Other Unusual Situations" 
Because the "course of employment" test is so fact sensitive, there may be rare situations 
which do not fall within the above categories, where compensation is still appropriate. The general 
rules applied in deciding whether to extend coverage in sucli situations are set forth in Walls v. 
Industrial Comm % 857 P.2d 964 (Utah App. 1993): 
Thus, an injury occurs 'in the course of employment when it takes place (1) within 
the period of employment, (2) at a place where the employee reasonably may be in 
the performance of her duties, and (3) while she is fulfilling those duties or engaged 
in doing something incidental thereto, [citations omitted]. 
Id., at 967, emphasis in the original. 
There was no evidence that Mojica was "within the period of employment", or "doing 
something incidental thereto" when he burned himself while playing dermatologist. Indeed, to 
stretch Mojica's case into a worker's compensation case would lead to the conclusion that a 
carpenter working on his skills in his home garage, building a c offee table for the living room, with 
a Skilsaw borrowed from his employer, would be entitled to compensation upon cutting off his 
fingers. Or, an associate attorney would be entitled to benefits, having taken home Black's Law 
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Dictionary to write an appeal brief, and dropping it on her foot. The warning of the Utah Supreme 
Court in Soldier Creek Coal Co. v. Bailey is apt: 
We decline to modify the premises rule to reach occurrences beyond the employer's 
boundaries that are not covered by the special hazard rule. The employer's property 
line provides a bright line test for application of the premises rule, based on the logic 
that while the employee is on the employer's premises, his connection with 
employment is both 'physical and tangible', [citation omitted]. If the premises rule 
were distorted to cover this case, it would create a distinction difficult to justify and 
hard to apply in future cases. 
Id., 709P.2datll67. 
C 
SURVEY OF UTAH CASES 
Other Utah course-of-employment cases support the conclusion that Mojica was not in his 
employment relationship when he was hurt. 
Stroud v. Industrial Comm % 272 P.2d 187, 2 Utah 2d 270 (1954). 
Stroud was a police officer with a gun issued by his employer. He went to the police station 
on his day off, and was helping another employee carry cases of soda pop for a police benefit party. 
While doing this, his gun fell and discharged, fatally shooting him in the heart. Unlike Stroud, 
Mojica was not at his employer's premises when he burned himself with the medical heating lamp. 
If Stroud had accidentally shot himself with his police weapon at home, while cleaning it, or while 
hunting with it, or while target shooting, his case might be similar to Mojica. Unlike the bullet which 
killed him, Stroud's case is a close miss for O'Currance. 
Kinne v. Industrial Comm % 609 P.2d 926 (Utah 1980) 
A truck driver, Wynn, stopped at his home on the way from Colorado to California. He was 
on his way from home to his employer's premises in the employer's truck when he was killed. Wynn 
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maintained and serviced the employer's truck at his home, and this arrangement was known to, and 
assented to by his employer. The facts suggest a similarity to Ae Clevite, in that the employee was 
required to work at home by the employer. The case is also similar to the "traveling employee" 
cases. Because the employer's truck was maintained at Wynn's home, it was reasonable for the 
Commission to conclude that there was no personal deviation in the course of the business trip. 
Askren v. Industrial Comm 'n, 391 P.2d 302; 15 Utah 2d 275 (1964); Wilson v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 384 P.2d 400; 14 Utah 2d 360 (1963). 
Askren fell in a cafeteria on the employer's premises, while eating lunch on her lunch break. 
This actually supports the "premises" rule, since the cafeteria, while nominally run by a third-party 
lessee, was still owned, maintained, furnished, and controlled by the employer. Wilson was also on 
her lunch hour, when she bought two rugs from her employer. While loading them into her car, a pile 
of tires fell on her, injuring her. Again, the "premises" rule supports the result. 
J&W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Comm 'n, 661 P.2d 949 (Utah 1988); Walls v. Industrial Comm 'n, 
857 P.2d 964 (Utah App. 1993). 
Tilt, the J&W employee, was employed to clean a large industrial mixer at a bakery. After 
the shift was over, Tilt stayed around waiting for another employee to finish his shift. While "fooling 
around", Tilt got into the empty mixer, and was accidentally "mixed", resulting in his death. 
Compensation was denied by the Utah Supreme Court. While analyzed as a "horseplay" case, the 
most significant fact seemed to be that the shift was over for Tilt. 
Walls was a bartender, who stayed after her shift ended to socialize. She volunteered to help 
the bartender on the job with a keg of beer, which fell on her injuring her. Despite being on the 
premises, compensation was denied. While it is difficult to square Walls with Askren and Wilson, 
Walls also supports the conclusion that Mojica was off the job. To make Mojica's case similar to 
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Walls, imagine if Mojica was hanging around socializing after work, and tried out the medical 
heating lamp on O'Currance's premises. Of course, Mojica was not on O'Currance premises when 
he used the heating lamp. And his use of the medical heating lamp had no direct benefit to 
O'Currance, unlike Walls, whose efforts to tap another keg directly fell (so to speak) within the 
scope of her normal work duties. 
Auerbach Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 195 P.2d 245; 113 Utah 347 (1948); Looser v. Industrial 
Comm % 337 P.2d 965; 9 Utah 2d 81 (1959); Black v. McDonald's ofLayton, 733 P.2d 154 (Utah 
1987). 
These cases fall into the category of "taking one for the team". Each involved an employee 
injured while engaging in a recreational activity, under some kind of sponsorship of the employer. 
Wardle played basketball for the "Auerbach Shamrocks", and was hurt while driving to a game. 
Looser was driving a company car in a sports car race on his own time, when he was injured. Black 
played in a softball league, on a team of McDonald's employees, when he was injured in an auto 
accident on the way to a game. In each of these cases, the employee was denied compensation. The 
fact that the injury occurred on the employee's own time seemed most determinative. Any incidental 
benefit to the employer through advertising or employee morale was deemed insufficient to place 
the employee back into the course of employment. 
Drake v. Industrial Comm % 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997); Martinson v. W-MIns. Agency, Inc., 606 
P.2d 256 (Utah 1980). 
These are "coming and going" cases. Drake was driving home after work, and on her way, 
dropping off work documents at another work office. Martinson was on the way home after meeting 
an insurance client for lunch. Neither were found to be in the course of their employment. 
11 
CONCLUSION 
Utah has consistently followed the "premises" rule, except in certain well-defined situations. 
It is hard to find a Utah case where an employee was found to be in the course of employment when 
not on the employer's premises, or after normal work hours. The facts of this case do not compel the 
courts to stake out new turf. Mojica had a fixed place of employment, on O'Currance's premises. 
He had fixed times of employment. His injury fell outside the bounds of either the times or places 
of his normal course of work. 
There are no additional facts to warrant an extension of course of employment to Mojica. 
O'Currance did not pay Mojica to take the medical heating lamp home and undertake a self-directed 
efficacy trial. Mojica was rewarded for his curiosity with serious injuries, but got no reward from 
his employer. His employer got no benefit either. It did not intend to advertise Mojica's anticipated 
successful treatment. It did not have a more healthy, happy employee. 
The trial court erred when it assumed that Mojica was in the course of his employment 
simply on the basis that he got hurt while using a medical device he brought home from work. The 
judgment should be set aside, and the case remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED THIS 19th day of March, 2005. 
- / / • 
Daniel F. Bertch 
Kevin K Robson 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this / ~^ day of March, 2005,1 served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, and by deposit in first class mail, postage prepaid to the 
following counsel of record: 
Robert L. Stevens 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
P.O Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465 
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ADDENDUM 
A 
ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
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ROBERT L. STEVENS 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant O'cnrrance, Inc. 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street / P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 / Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COLRT OF THE THIRL jUDIv.'JAL OiSTF i d 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVE MOJICA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHONGOING BASHAN INSTRUMENT 
FACTORY, INC.; GLOBAL HEALTH 
SOLUTIONS, INC.; NATURAL 
WELLNESS NETWORK, INC.; 
O'CURRANCE, INC., and JOHN DOES I-V, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT AS AGAINST 
DEFENDANT O'CURRANCE, INC. AND 
ORDER CERTIFYING THIS 
DISMISSAL AS A FINAL ORDER 
UNDER RULE 54(B) UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Civil No. 040905109 
Judge Anthony B. Quirm 
This matter came before the Court upon defendant O'currance, Inc.'s Motion for 
Judgement on the Pleadings dismissing plaintiffs Complaint as against it. Plaintiff was 
represented by his attorney of record, Daniel Bertch. Defendant O'currance, Inc. was represented 
by its attorney of record, Robert L. Stevens. None of the other defendants have been served or 
have made any appearance in this matter. They were not represented. 
The Court having heard the arguments of counsel and having reviewed the 
Memoranda in the file, stated its ruling from the bench and now enters its Order as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant O'currance, Inc 's Motion for 
Judgement on the Pleadings dismissing plaintiffs Complaint as against it is granted. The Court 
hereby dismisses plaintiffs Complaint as against O'currance, Inc. with prejudice. This Order is 
based upon the Court's conclusion that under the facts alleged in the Complaint plaintiffs 
injuries arose out of his ra?pIoymor;r relation with defendant O'cur^wnce and therefore pla-ntiffis 
precluded from filing a tort claim outside the Worker's Compensation Act against O'currance. 
The Court did not reach or rule upon the other asserted bases for dismissal. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to the Stipulation of the 
parties and good cause appearing therefore, the Court certifies this Order of Dismissal of 
defendant O'currance, Inc. as a final Order pmsuant to Rule 54(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Court specifically determines that there is no just reason for delay in entering judgement 
with regard to this claim. 
DATED this / day of October, 2004. 
DANIEL F. BERTCH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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